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ABSTRACT

This article proposes an approach to justifying patentable subject matter that uses Locke as its
starting point, and utilitarianism as its end. The patent eligibility of any given subject matter must
be a mixture of labour and certain utilitarian incentives. If these elements are present-and if the
subject matter in question can be made to fit within the definition of invention (even if slightly
uncomfortably)-then courts and tribunals should aim to accommodate it.
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THE UTILITARIAN FRUITS APPROACH TO
JUSTIFYING PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
EMIR ALY CROWNE*

I. INTRODUCTION
In my writings on subject matter eligibility, I have consistently argued that
exclusions from subject matter eligibility ought to be approached narrowly and
strictly.' I argue that the "unholy triumvirate"-natural/physical phenomena, laws
of nature (including scientific principles and abstract theorems) and abstract ideas
(including mental steps) 2 -is the only rational baseline from which courts should
exclude patentable subject matter. The triumvirate, without something "more,"
merely provides information (or ways of thinking) about the world. The triumvirate
is a collection of unapplied subject matter. Against this baseline, "difficult" areas like
biotechnology and nanotechnology can be better rationalized. If the "invention" is for
the pure discovery, or a law of nature, then it cannot be protectable subject matter,
because it is unapplied "information." If on the other hand these "inventions" go
beyond mere discovery, and result in isolated substances that would not otherwise
naturally occur-which possess some quality, property, form or characteristic that
distinguishes it, in a non-trivial way, from its natural state-then this is precisely
the type of advance that the patent system was designed to protect. So too, software,
business methods, and professional skill which do not amount to a monopolization of
*C Emir Aly Crowne 2011. Emir Aly Crowne is an Assistant Professor at the University of
Windsor, Faculty of Law and Of Counsel to Heydary Hamilton PC. The author wishes to thank
Emily Carasco, Richard Austin, Allan Hutchinson, and Robert Home for their kind support and
mentorship. The funding of the Law Foundation of Ontario is also gratefully acknowledged, as is
the unseen and tireless efforts of the editors at the John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property
Law. The collegial support of Annette Demers, Mohamed Hashim, Varoujan Arman, Terry Reid,
and Andrew Black are also gratefully acknowledged.

1See

generally Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammad,

The EPC Exceptions to Patentable Subject

Matter in the United Kingdom, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 435 (2010); Emir Aly CrowneMohammad, A Review of the 'as such' Exclusions to Patentable Subject Matter in the United
Kingdom: Lessons for Canadian and American Courts, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 457 (2010)
[hereinafter Review of the 'as such' Exclusions]; Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammad, Can You Patent
That? A Review of Subject Matter Eligibility in Canada and the United States, 23 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 269 (2009); Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammad, The Patentability of Professional Skills and
Business Methods in Canada, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 119 (2010); Emir Aly CrowneMohammad, What Is an Invention? A Review of the Literature on Patentable Subject Matter, 15
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2008); Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammad, Playing Games With The Jurisprudence:
Are Casino Games PatentableIn Canada?, 12 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 577 (2008).
I also accept that I may have implicitly bought into what Peter Drahos calls
"proprietarianism," which he describes as "a creed and an attitude which inclines its holders
towards a property fundamentalism." PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
201 (1996). "Proprietarianism consists of three core beliefs: a belief in the moral priority of property
rights over other rights and interests, a belief in the first connection thesis [the person with the first
connection with a good ought to have a property right in it] and the existence of a negative
commons." Id. at 202. See also E. Richard Gold, The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional
Competence, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 263, 263 n.5 (2004).
2 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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mathematical truths, mental steps, or abstract ideas are all the proper subject
matter of a patent, if they are applied to some useful, non-obvious and inventive end.
Beyond the "unholy triumvirate," other judicially crafted exceptions to patentable
subject matter-which are not grounded in statute-are difficult to justify in systems
of law that pride themselves on legislative intent and supremacy.
Indeed, an examination of the cases on patentable subject matter across Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom all share the common utilitarian concern
of protecting innovation and promoting disclosure. 3 As such, my approach to
patentable subject matter (discussed infra) uses Locke as its starting point, and
utilitarianism as its end. 4 The patent eligibility of any given subject matter must be
a mixture of labour and certain utilitarian incentives.
If these elements are
present-and, as noted earlier, if the subject matter in question can be made to fit
within the definition of invention (even if slightly uncomfortably)-then courts and
tribunals should aim to accommodate it.
Even though I have proposed a philosophical theory to ground my views on
patentable subject matter, I realize that judicial decision making is rarely (if ever)
grounded purely in theory. To this end, the radical pragmatist agenda is appealing
because it frames judicial decision making in the appropriate context. Adam Moore
puts it well:
According to the radical pragmatist, judges and legislators, upon
recognizing that their perceptions of reality arbitrarily color the decision
making process, should reject theory and do their best to be fair and
just....

3 Interestingly, Adam Goodman notes that the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty and the Canadian Supreme Court in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of
Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.), actually employed the same utilitarian approach to arrive at
diametrically opposite conclusions regarding the patentability of life forms:
In juxtaposing these two cases, one should see the divergence possible within the

Anglo-American tradition. However, one should be careful to note that while the

conclusions are diametrically opposed, the route taken to get there is exactly the
same-utilitarianism. Both courts claim to rule as they do in the name of the
public interest. Neither differ on where they are going, i.e., the highest level of
public utility, only on how to get there.
Adam Goodman, The Origins of the Modern Patent in the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade, 19 INTELL.
PROP. J. 297, 308 (2006).
4 Using the labour-desert theory as the starting point for my utilitarian arguments is precisely
what Alan Ryan meant when he said that natural rights theories have "a buried utilitarian
assumption." ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 63 (1987); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally
Justified? The Philosophy of PropertyRights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 819
n.5 (1990) (noting that "natural rights arguments and utilitarian arguments .. ,. are close cousins");
see also Richard A. Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 713, 716 (1989) (questioning whether there is a "sharp line" distinguishing natural rights'
theorists and utilitarians). This duality is also demonstrated in the patent literature. See David S.
Olsen, Taking the UtilitarianBasis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable
Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 181 (2009) (taking a decidedly utilitarian view of patent law);
Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
"Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1006 (2007) (arguing that patent law is
best understood as a "labor-rewarding policy").
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Moreover, radical pragmatists argue experience has demonstrated that
following grand theories either fails to yield answers to tough legal
questions or leads to absurd results.
In the place of theory the
pragmatist urges judges and legislators to adopt practical reason as
a method for understanding the historical, cultural, contingent,
and radically subjective views of those participating in a legal
system."5
One troubling aspect of the radical pragmatist agenda is the denial of the
existence of objective facts or knowledge. 6 Therefore the validity of that statement
itself should be denied by the radical pragmatist. This circularity makes radical
pragmatism an unacceptable foundation for any theory.

II. JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The justification(s) for the existence and emergence of intellectual property rights
in general, and patent rights in particular, have traditionally been framed in terms of
labour desert theory and/or personality theory. 7 Labour desert theory is usually
credited to the work of John Locke, and his Second Treatise of Government where he
wrote that "every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to
but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his own hands, we may say, are
properly his."8 Thus, whoever mixes their labour with resources that are either
"free" or held in common with others, are entitled to a "natural right" over the fruits
of that labour. 9 Personality theory has its roots in the writings of Hegel 10 and
Kant, 11 and stems from the view that ideas are an embodiment of its creator and
5Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property: Theory, Privilege, and Pragmatism, 16 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 191, 194-95 (2003) (emphasis added).
6Id. at 194.

7For a review of these theories see Palmer, supra note 4, and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
8JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts

Press 1952) (1690).
9 See Edward C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 36 (1989).
We can justify propertizing ideas under Locke's approach with three propositions:
first, that the production of ideas requires a person's labor; second, that these
ideas are appropriated from a "common" which is not significantly devalued by the
idea's removal; and third, that ideas can be made property without breaching the
non-waste condition. Many people implicitly accept these propositions. Indeed,
the Lockean explanation of intellectual property has immediate, intuitive appeal:
it seems as though people do work to produce ideas and that the value of these
ideas-especially since there is no physical component-depends solely upon the
individual's mental "work."
Hughes, supra note 7, at 300. See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 140
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
10 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W.
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).

11IMMANUEL

KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF

ETHICS (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott et al. trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1929) (1879).
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their will and the best way to protect and control one's personhood is through
property rights. In his seminal work on the philosophy of intellectual property,
Justin Hughes writes that: "[p]roperly elaborated, the labor and personality theories
together exhaust the set of morally acceptable justifications of intellectual property.
In short, intellectual property is either labor or personality, or it is theft." 1 2
To Hughes then, intellectual property rights must either be justified as a result
of labour or personality. Not both. However, the Lockean labour desert theory
appears largely inapplicable to the "first-to-file" method of determining eligibility for
patent rights; 1 3 and personality theory cannot fully account for patents on subject
matter like genes and life forms (surely no aspect of the inventor's "personality" can
seriously be said to be found in these inventions?). As trite as these criticisms may
be, it is useful to note that many of these theories of "intellectual property" have been
written or framed with copyright in mind. 14 Patents are usually thrown in for good
measure. 15 This perhaps explains why theorists have turned to utilitarianism for the
justification of technological inventions in particular. 16 Indeed, if theorists had not
turned to utilitarianism, and had adopted Hughes, then patents for technological
inventions would have to be considered a form of theft.

III. THE "UTILITARIAN FRUITS" APPROACH TO SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
The theory that I propose for justifying the patentability of any given subject
matter is grounded on a new type of reward theory17 that takes a modified Lockean
12 Hughes, supra note 7, at 290.
13 Id. at 365. A Lockean labour theory can overcome this objection by suggesting that the
patent right per se does not emerge at the moment of invention (the Eureka! moment). The "mere"
invention is but the starting point to acquiring patent/property right itself. The "invention" per se is
not the patent right. In other words, because the patent monopoly is a monopoly granted by the
state to eligible subject matter which satisfies the elements of novelty, inventiveness and utility,
then the patent "right" per se is contingent up to that point. The patent right really only comes into
existence once the patent is granted. The labour involved in acquiring that patent right is ongoing from the moment of "invention" through to the grant of the patent.

Only then does the "bundle"

become complete.
14 See Brian Fitzgerald, Theoretical Underpinning of Intellectual Property: I Am a Pragmatist
but Theory Is My Rhetoric, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 179 (2003) (analyzing copyrightability
under the utilitarian incentive-based argument).
15See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case
Against Incentive Based Arguments, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 602 (2002-2003) (analyzing patentability
under the utilitarian incentive-based arguments for intellectual property).
16Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 129, 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) ("Utilitarian theorists
generally endorsed the creation of intellectual property rights as an appropriate means to foster
innovation, subject to the caveat that such rights are limited in duration so as to balance the social
welfare loss of monopoly exploitation.").
17 Id. at 146; Samuel Oddi, Un-unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 275-77 (1996). But see Kevin Rhodes, The Federal Circuit's
Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1051, 1080 (providing the narrower version of reward theory).
[R]eward theory predicts that the patent system limits patentability to those
inventions where the incentive of a patent is essential to ensure investment in the
research needed for discovery; only in this case can the social benefit of patent
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view of property rights 18 as its starting point. I argue that the patentable subject
matter threshold is low and should be read expansively in light of the purpose of
patent law to protect unforeseen advances. Inventors should therefore be rewarded
for their labour. However, this invocation of the Lockean approach is tempered by
the fact that Locke himself (assuming he turned his mind to the unlikely topic of
patentable subject matter) would likely have argued that "mere" discoveries are not
patentable subject matter, as these are the things that "God" gave to all "men in
common
God, who has given the world to men in common, has also given them
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The
earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of
their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces and beasts it
feeds belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the
spontaneous hand of nature; and nobody has originally a private dominion,
exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their
natural state......19
Therefore, under the Lockean model, patentable subject matter covers anything
that is mixed with labour, with the exception of discoveries or things that pre-existed
in nature (like scientific theories or natural phenomena).
However, there are the Lockean provisos. These are Locke's own limitations on
acquiring property rights through labour. The first proviso states that one can
acquire property rights only where there is "enough and as good left in common for
others." 20 The second proviso-concerning waste and spoilage-states that property
rights can only be acquired in items to satisfy our needs (anything more is wasteful
and leads to spoilage). 21
In my modified Lockean approach to patentable subject matter, I do not adopt
any of Locke's provisos. 22 Aside from the fact that these provisos were specifically
created to deal with "real" property rights (as with Locke's theory as a whole), they

rights outweigh the considerable social costs. In determining patentability of an
invention, the theory calls for focusing on the technical advance represented in
the invention, in order to weed out those advances not worthy of a patent.
Id.
18 LOCKE, supra note 8, at 17 ("Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property.").
19 Id.
2

0Id.
21Id. at 19.

There is also a "third" proviso on charity on subsistence which can be found in Locke's First
Treatise. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 42 (1689) ("As Justice gives every
Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors
descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep
him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise. . . ."). This proviso is rarely
spoken of in the intellectual property literature, but it too seems to be either inappropriate, or at
odds, with basic patent doctrine. But for situations involving public health and state emergencies,
there are no other examples where "extreme want" will serve as a defense or justification for what
would otherwise amount to patent infringement.
22
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also appear to be inconsistent with the entire patent system. For instance, Hettinger
points out that current patent law runs afoul of the first proviso:
[B]y giving the original inventor an exclusive right to make, use, and sell
the invention. Subsequent inventors who independently come up with an
already patented invention cannot even personally use their invention,
much less patent or sell it. They clearly suffer a great and unfair loss
because of the original patent grant. Independent inventors should not be
prohibited from using or selling their inventions. Proving independent
discovery of a publicly available patented invention would be difficult,
however.23
The second proviso is also fundamentally at odds with basic patent law. This
proviso demands that one acquires property rights to satisfy our needs (and no more),
but the fact that patents are negative rights does not accord with this proviso.
Indeed, to the extent that patents can simply be acquired as a defensive strategy (as
in many technology companies) or as an offensive strategy (as with so-called patent
trolls), many patent rights are not acquired to satisfy "needs," rather they are
acquired to satisfy "wants."24
Insofar as these provisos are disconnected with the fundamental nature of the
patent system-and given the fact that Locke was clearly writing with "real"
property interests in mind-I do not adopt these provisos for my own subject matter
eligibility theory. I am also drawn to the views of writers like Hettinger and Hull
who warn about adopting a purely Lockean approach to various aspects of
intellectual property. 25 In fact Hull notes that a purely Lockean approach to
intellectual property rights may actually shrink the scope of these rights, perhaps
even to non-existence. 26 I am more cautious. I adopt Locke only to the extent that he
has fashioned a theory that rewards inventors for the "fruits of their labour."
However, this still does not exclude abstract ideas or even subject matter like the fine
23Hettinger, supra note 9, at 44. One could argue that once an invention becomes patentable,
then it is no longer part of "the common."

Therefore,

an inventor does not deprive future or

concurrent inventors of "the common," rather she is depriving them of that particular advance that
was arrived at when that inventor combined her labour with the common in a novel, inventive and
useful way. The first proviso may also have implications for patentable subject matter. The
patentability of the so-called tools of basic scientific research (discussed later in this section) may be
precisely the type of "common" that ought not be the property of anyone. I argue that the tools of
basic scientific research are very rarely "basic"-in the sense that the scientific enterprise is
constantly revealing layers of fundamentality or "truth"-such that the tools of basic scientific
research insofar as they are not pre-existing natural phenomena, scientific principles or abstractions
are precisely the types of advances that the patent monopoly ought to protect. The 'hide and hoard'
clich6 becomes all too real if these "tools" were denied patent protection.
24One could argue that all corporations acquire patents to satisfy their corporate "needs," but I
would suggest that this line of reasoning is specious, and denies the fact that many patents are
granted to independent inventors, researchers and hobbyists.
25See generally Hettinger, supra note 9; Gordon Hull, Clearing The Rubbish: Locke, the Waste
Proviso, and the Moral Justification of Intellectual Property, 23 PUB. AFF. Q. 67 (2009).
26Hull, supra note 25, at 68-71. See also, William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property,
in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 185-86 (Stephen R. Munzer ed.,
2001) (citing additional problems with a purely Lockean approach to intellectual property-e.g.
"what counts as 'intellectual labor?"' and "what exactly is the 'commons' in intellectual property?").
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arts, from patentability. Something more is needed in this model to support my
approach to subject matter eligibility.
Enter utilitarianism, and the alleged role that incentives play in promoting the
public disclosure of inventions. The "incentives" that are particular to my theory of
subject matter eligibility concern reproducibility and enforceability. 27 Both of these
elements are utilitarian in nature because the patent bargain itself and the
inventor's willingness to disclose their invention are tied to both of these concepts,
respectively.
Patentable subject matter must be reproducible in the sense that it must be
capable of description within the patent specification as to enable someone skilled in
the art to create it or put it into effect. This excludes subject matter like the fine arts
and other fields where labour is a necessary-but not sufficient-ingredient to
ground patentable subject matter. If the public cannot properly work the claimed
invention, then from a utilitarian perspective, the quid pro quo is disproportionately
skewed in favour of the inventor, who may receive the benefit of a monopoly 28
without disclosing how the invention actually works. 29 This would also exclude
subject matter that inherently relies upon individualistic skill, judgment or
expertise. If a method cannot be reduced to concrete, repeatable steps in the patent
specification, then this unfairly monopolises mental steps and pure skills. 30
Patentable subject matter should never extend this far.

27Although I appreciate that issues of reproducibility and enforceability are conceptually
different than questions of subject matter eligibility, they are still closely connected. Just as the
exclusion of laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas per se are grounded in their lack
of practical application (a question of utility), so too, the mere fact that my proposed theory
incorporates reproducibility and enforceability merely underscores the interrelatedness of subject
matter eligibility with other aspects of the patent bargain.
28 In fact, if the public cannot glean how the invention works, it effectively gives the inventor a
perpetual monopoly (unless the disclosure is challenged for sufficiency).
29See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
[T]he quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable
one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has

expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the
industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.
Id.

30 On the other hand, if the method can be reduced to concrete, repeatable steps that can be
put into effect by someone skilled in the art (in a relatively routine, mechanistic manner)-and is
novel, inventive, and useful-then this subject matter ought to be properly patentable. See, e.g.,
Dec. No. 896, [1981] Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents (Can.), available at http://brevetspatents.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/comdec/eng/decision/896/summary.html.
In that case, the Patent Appeal
Board stated:
A mental step in the sense in which the term is employed in patent language is a
step in a process, the performance of which is ascertained or controlled by the
dictates of the human mind, which step may be performed manually or by
mechanical, electrical or chemical means. A mental step which is judgmental or
interpretive (purely mental) is definitive of a process the result of which depends
on the intelligence and reasoning of the human mind. It seems settled that it is
only this latter type of mental step which renders a process unpatentable. The
mere fact that a human operator must provide a control function in a claimed
process does not per se render it unpatentable.
Id.
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The element of enforceability is the final peg for my theoretical orientation. If
the patentable subject matter in question cannot be enforced then it is ineligible for
patentability (ubi jus ibi remedium).31 Even without statutory exclusions, it is
nonsensical to grant patents over abstract ideas because their infringement (if it can
even be called that) can never be enforced. 32 From a utilitarian perspective, there is
no incentive to invent (or at least no incentive to publicly disclose what one has
invented) if there is no means of enforcing the boundaries of that patent monopoly.33
Although these theories of property are sometimes presented as being competing
alternatives to one another, I view them as "close cousins." 34 Indeed, using the
labour desert theory as the starting point for my utilitarian arguments is precisely
what Alan Ryan meant when he said that natural rights theories have "a buried
utilitarian assumption." 35 In other words, by respecting the private rights of
individuals in modern society, the utilitarian agenda of maximizing "felicity" is
actually promoted.
Therefore, the suggested approach to patentable subject matter-the utilitarian
fruits approach-takes Locke as its starting point and utilitarianism as its end.
Approaches to patentable subject matter can be explained or justified as a mixture of
labour and certain incentives. These "incentives" are refined to mean reproducibility
(for the public's benefit) and enforceability (primarily, for the inventor's benefit). If
these elements are present-and the subject matter in question can be made to fit
within the definition of invention (even if slightly uncomfortably), then courts and
tribunals should aim to accommodate it.

31 See

Crowne, Review of the "as such" Exclusions, supra note 1, at 470.

32 Id.

33 Alternatively, if the enforcement of the patent would lead to absurdity, then the "cost" of the
patent bargain is skewed disproportionately in favour of the inventor. This aspect of the patent
bargain was mentioned by the Supreme Court of Canada in Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation
Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 (Can.). The Court wrote that:

A patent, as has been said many times, is not intended as an accolade or civic

award for ingenuity. It is a method by which inventive solutions to practical
problems are coaxed into the public domain by the promise of a limited monopoly
for a limited time. Disclosure is the quid pro quo for valuable proprietary rights
to exclusivity which are entirely the statutory creature of the Patent Act.
Monopolies are associated in the public mind with higher prices. The
public should not be expected to pay an elevated price in exchange for
speculation, or for the statement of "any mere scientific principle or
abstract theorem" (s. 27(3)), or for the "discovery" of things that already
exist, or are obvious. The patent monopoly should be purchased with the
hard coinage of new, ingenious, useful and unobvious disclosures.
Id. (emphasis added). For instance, from a utilitarian perspective the costs to society would be too
great if patents were granted for mere natural phenomena or scientific theories because they could
infringed by merely "existing" (e.g. an unapplied mathematical equation that describes heart rate,
gravity, hair growth, etc.).
34 Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 819 n.5 (1990).
35 Id.; see Richard Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J. LAW &
PUBL. POL'Y 713, 717-18 (questioning the "sharp line" between natural rights' and utilitarian
theorists).
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I acknowledge that by invoking Locke and certain aspects of utilitarianism, I
have implicitly attracted the baggage and criticisms of those theories.3 6 Nonetheless,
I emphasize that my theoretical orientation only borrows from Locke in part, and is
specifically tied to patentable subject matter 37 and should not be extrapolated beyond
this.38 My utilitarian fruits approach to subject matter eligibility is intended to
frame but one element of patentability, patentable subject matter.
The other
elements of patentability-novelty, inventiveness and utility-must all still be
present of course, and justified accordingly. Unlike other Lockean (or part-Lockean)
theories proposed, my approach to patentable subject matter (even across multiple
jurisdictions), does not require a radical change in intellectual property laws. 39
It is true that "[i]ntellectual property is rarely justified on one theory." 40 Many
of the philosophical (and even economic) 41 justifications for the existence of the entire

36 See Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. Patent
System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561, 568-79 (criticizing utilitarianism and

natural rights theories); Ikechi Mgbeoji, A Protective Mechanism for Indigenous Knowledge on the
Medicinal Uses of Plants, 5 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (criticizing all of the major rationales for
patenting, including the conflict between "natural rights" theories and patents as state granted
monopolies of a limited duration).
37 Erik Maurer provides an interesting economic justification for a broad interpretation of
patentable subject matter in his eponymous paper. See Erik Maurer, An Economic Justification for
a Broad Interpretationof Patentable Subject Matter, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1057, 1073-74 (2001).
38 For an application of the Lockean approach to compulsory patent licensing see, Richard T.
Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y
117 (2004). For an early attempt at finding a unified theory of patents see, Samuel Oddi, supra note
17, at 271 ("The conclusion that no unifying theory has yet been presented is not intended to
diminish the quest for theories, economic and otherwise . . . nonetheless, any unifying theory of
patents is apt to prove even more elusive than the unify theory in science.").
39See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 92101 (1997) (proposing that fair use, the first sale doctrine and "exclusive patent rights" are
inconsistent with Lockean ideals and therefore should all be eliminated).
40 See Menell, supra note 16, at 163; Shubba Ghosh, Patent Law and the Assurance Game:
Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 307, 328-32 (2005). In
justifying patents as a mean of self regulation, Ghosh writes:

The assurance game allows us to consider some overlooked dimensions of the
debate over the limitations of morality and the public order.
Denying
patentability forces inventors of immoral or unsafe inventions to resort to trade
secret law or self-help for protection.
As has been pointed out by other
commentators, denial of patenting does not necessarily mean suppression of the
invention. The use of trade secret law would still permit undesirable inventions
to exist and be disseminated. Furthermore, the use of secrecy makes it more
difficult for such inventions to be regulated by general health and safety laws
since these inventions may escape the sunlight of disclosure. As a result, denial of
patentability is not desirable under the terms of the assurance game not because
of the stronger property protection, but because of the effects on the ability to
regulate and promote market integrity.

. .. The assurance game shifts our attention to a different conception of patents
and intellectual property, not as elements of a hypothetical bargain, but as
regulatory tools. Rethinking intellectual property law as regulatory sharpens the
focus on how the law affects the inventive process and the marketplace and opens
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patent system remain incomplete. 42 This is the nature of "justifications." In the
spirit of pragmatism and practicality, society accepts that not all criminal
punishment serves a deterrent, rehabilitative or punitive effect, 43 in the same way
that the justifications which underlie the patent monopoly may not be wholly
adequate. Nonetheless, the patent system exists.

IV. CONCLUSION
From a practical perspective, I have argued in other workS 44 that where the
subject matter in question can be made to fit within the definition of invention (even
if slightly uncomfortably), then courts and tribunals should aim to accommodate it.
This is how courts should deal with issues of subject matter eligibility. These
practical considerations can be grounded with the theoretical approach I propose
within this paper-the utilitarian fruits approach. This approach explains/justifies
patentable subject matter as a mixture of labour and incentive; where "incentives"
are refined to mean reproducibility (for the public's benefit) and enforceability
(primarily, for the inventor's benefit). Unless the exclusions to patentability are
grounded in statute, my utilitarian fruits approach promotes a broad and permissive
view of patentability.
With these twin approaches, much of the confusion
surrounding patentable subject matter can be simplified and rationalized into a
coherent body of jurisprudence that is consistent with the underlying goals of the
patent system as promoting innovation and public disclosure.
the door for a more complete view of the relationship between government and
property.
Id. (citations omitted). I should also note that I am not drawn to the assurance game either when it
comes to justifying patentable subject matter (or even patents as a whole), since the assurance game
implicitly treats patents as positive rights. The assumption that there is a "marketplace" for
inventions denies the fundamental nature of patents as negative rights (the right to exclude others).
41See Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of the Useful Arts, 10
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 133 (2009); Michael McAleer & Daniel Slottje, A Simple New
Measure of Innovation: The Patent Success Ratio, 63 SCIENTOMETRICS 421 (2005); Edwin Mansfield,
Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986); Petra Moser, How Do
Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1214 (2005); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).

42For instance, Alexander Tabarrok notes that:
According to the economic theory of patents, patents are needed so that pioneer
firm have time to recoup their sunk costs of research and development. The key
element in the economic theory is that pioneer firms have large, hard to recoup,
sunk costs. Yet patents are not awarded on the basis of a firm's sunk
costs. Patent law, in fact, ignores costs. The disconnect between patent law
and patent theory suggests either that modifying patent law so that it better fits
with patent theory would reduce the costs and inefficiencies associated with
current patent practice or that the standard economic theory of patents is wrong.
Alexander Tabarrok, Abstract, Patent Theory Versus Patent Law, 1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2002), http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art9 (emphasis
added).
43 See generally George Vold, Thomas Bernard & Jeffery Snipes, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
(5th ed. 2002) (providing a insight into criminology, deviant behavior, and social conflict).
44 See articles cited supra note 1.

